PLANYC2030: Transportation and the Central Business District

The Bureau of Economic Analysis has released 2005 Local Area Personal Income data, and while I will discuss it in detail when I have time, I can say that one thing continued to be true: excluding the Health and Social Service industries, which are primarily government-financed, Manhattan accounted for half (in this case 49.8%) of all the private-sector earnings in New York State. Not the city or metro region — the entire state. Given that just about everyone from Montauk to Buffalo is living off the economic engine of the Manhattan Central Business District directly or indirectly, it is no surprise that PLANYC2030 is focused on the transportation system that supports it. And with the cost of maintaining the existing rail and road transportation systems, let alone new transportation facilities, so great that one wonders if even Manhattan can afford it, it is no surprise that the plan merely restates many major projects and initiatives already agreed to, such as the Second Avenue Subway, East Side Access, and a new tunnel to New Jersey. The plan has, in reality, two new major proposals. First, it suggests using zoning to move new development to places with existing rail transit, rather than extending rail lines to new areas, since new rail transit lines are for the most part not affordable. Second, it includes a financing proposal to relieve CBD traffic congestion while also preventing the transportation system from going bankrupt and taking the Manhattan CBD, and thus the city and state, down with it.

For the past 12 years, New York’s politicians have provided a wonderful deal: fares deeply reduced relative to inflation, more service, extensive investment, a big pension enhancement for transit workers, and tax reductions as both the city and state nearly stopped contributing to the MTA capital. They did so by sacrificing a future through borrowing, a future that is soon to arrive. Every politician, including one of those running for Mayor, knows the fastest route to popularity in today’s America is to promise something for nothing to people who don’t expect to be around when the bill comes due, and don’t really care about those who will be here. Incoming Governor Spitzer did nothing in his first budget to address the upcoming reduction in our financial circumstances, merely continuing the borrowing that will eventually have to be paid back. Mayor Bloomberg has done the same though nearly the entirety of his administration, basking in the approval of a thankful public.

Until now. Preventing the collapse of the existing transit system, roads and bridges, and the deterioration of existing streets, as much as relieving congestion, is what the congestion pricing proposal is about. As the plan says “the greatest factor in determining the success of our city in the 21st Century may be whether we can summon the collective will to generate the funds necessary to meet the transportation needs of the future.” The shrewd political alternative is probably to “protect people” buy promising not to collect the funds, and to either be out of office or arrange for someone else to be blamed when the future arrives. “We demand that the federal government fund the entire cost,” and when they don’t, “it’s all the Republicans’ fault,” or the Democrats’ fault or A-Rod’s fault. That appears to be the plan many elected officials will follow, especially at the state level. They and their supporters will get their pensions, and their parking permits, regardless, as they did in the 1970s.

Do I agree with the PLANYC2030 funding plan? I don’t have a better idea — and neither does anyone else as far as I can tell. After all, fares will have to go up, taxes will have to be increased, and service improvements will have to be done without, just to pay back debts already incurred while maintaining existing facilities. If more is going to be paid on top of that, those paying could at least be offered less traffic on the streets in exchange, which congestion pricing would provide. There is a problem with funding necessities with charges for people doing things the government would rather they didn’t. The city and state are already facing a fiscal disaster if people stop smoking or gambling; the plan would make the entire transportation system dependent on people driving to Manhattan. On the other hand, given the extensive investment in road capacity to Manhattan, it wouldn’t make sense to have people stop using it altogether. What would make sense is reducing the number who did so to the point that traffic can move as easily on weekdays as it does on weekends.

If I have an issue with the plan, it isn’t with what is covered. It is with what is not covered, or is covered to a limited extent.

While the housing section proposes using zoning to direct new development to areas in proximity to the exiting subway system, the transportation section proposes little for CBD travel by those already living beyond that system. That is a tough nut. Transit works poorly in lower density areas, since the limited number of customers forces either infrequent service, deep subsidies, are both. For example, the Staten Island Railroad covered only 16.8% of its operating costs from fares compared with 68.3% for the subway, according to the National Transit Database. In 2001 Staten Island averaged 199 weekday passengers per New York City Transit bus, compared with 532 in Brooklyn, 536 in Queens, 572 in the Bronx, and 700 in Manhattan, based on ridership data and a bus assignment table I had access to at the time.

The plan does propose an expansion of “bus rapid transit.” But the gains from BRT are limited without a grade separated right of way, at least in locations where two major arterial streets cross and neither can have traffic signal priority. For example, the M15 bus on First and Second Avenue in Manhattan, the most heavily used bus route in the nation, moves much faster northbound than southbound according to its current schedule, and according to the “Hub Bound” transportation data series, it carries many more passengers in that direction as well. Why? Because First Avenue benefits from an underpass to speed travel across 42nd Street, and travels under the Queensboro Bridge. Southbound buses on Second Avenue get waiting for cross-town traffic at the bridge approach at 59th Street and crossing 42nd Street.

In addition, the Plan doesn’t propose alternatives to travel by automobile for trips outside the Manhattan Central Business District, including non-work trips. That is an even tougher nut. From a public sector point of view, it is only along heavily trafficked corridors that mass transit can be provided without a financially ruinous subsidy level, and Manhattan and nearby regional centers such as Downtown Brooklyn are the only centers of activity large enough to create that level of traffic. It is very difficult to provide a financially viable transit service with a reasonable travel time from part of Staten Island to part of the Bronx.

In addition, from the perspective of the individual person, once you have a car, it is almost always faster and cheaper to use than to use transit. That is because most of the cost of a private automobile is fixed, including the cost of buying it and paying insurance, and is paid whether the cart is used or not. The variable cost is much less important, even at high gas prices. Taking my own 10 year old car as an example, if I were to sell it today at the Edmunds.com price, it would have cost me (in $2006) $246 per month to purchase and repair, $147 per month to insure, and $25 per month in taxes and fees. In contrast, gasoline cost just $35 per month, tolls $25, and maintenance also just $25. Most of what I pay for travel by auto, therefore, is paid whether I use the car or pay once again for transit. The Manhattan CBD is perhaps the only place in American where the cost of parking (for those who do not get permits to park on the street for free) is high enough that transit is cheaper, and where congestion bad enough that transit is faster.

To be a complete plan, and impact global warming to a greater extent, more has to be offered to those who live beyond walking distance from rail transit, and travel outside the CBD. I will offer (or re-offer) some suggestions in my next post.