Tag: Albany

The September Current Employment Survey data from the New York State Department of Labor is out, and with the kids back in school and the schools staffed up we can now look back on the Pataki era in public employment in full.  And here is something you won’t read in the New York Post or the New York Sun, that won’t be analyzed by the Manhattan Institute, and that won’t be brought up by Republican candidate for Governor John Faso.  Nor will it be mentioned by the New York Times, analyzed by the Fiscal Policy Institute, or pointed to by Democratic candidate for Governor Eliot Spitzer.  From September 1994 to September 2006, local government employment in the portion of New York State outside New York City rose by 93,600.  This in the face of a much-discussed stagnation in population and private employment there.  This includes a below-average gain of 2,300 from September 2005 to September 2006.

The September Current Employment Survey data from the New York State Department of Labor is out, and with the kids back in school and the schools staffed up we can now look back on the Pataki era in public employment in full.  And here is something you won’t read in the New York Post or the New York Sun, that won’t be analyzed by the Manhattan Institute, and that won’t be brought up by Republican candidate for Governor John Faso.  Nor will it be mentioned by the New York Times, analyzed by the Fiscal Policy Institute, or pointed to by Democratic candidate for Governor Eliot Spitzer.  From September 1994 to September 2006, local government employment in the portion of New York State outside New York City rose by 93,600.  This in the face of a much-discussed stagnation in population and private employment there.  This includes a below-average gain of 2,300 from September 2005 to September 2006.

The September Current Employment Survey data from the New York State Department of Labor is out, and with the kids back in school and the schools staffed up we can now look back on the Pataki era in public employment in full.  And here is something you won’t read in the New York Post or the New York Sun, that won’t be analyzed by the Manhattan Institute, and that won’t be brought up by Republican candidate for Governor John Faso.  Nor will it be mentioned by the New York Times, analyzed by the Fiscal Policy Institute, or pointed to by Democratic candidate for Governor Eliot Spitzer.  From September 1994 to September 2006, local government employment in the portion of New York State outside New York City rose by 93,600.  This in the face of a much-discussed stagnation in population and private employment there.  This includes a below-average gain of 2,300 from September 2005 to September 2006.

Economically efficient taxation includes a low tax rate spread over a wide tax base. In New York State, on the other hand, politically efficient taxation includes high tax rates spread over a tax base narrowed by exemptions, privileges, deductions, and tolerated tax evasion. Preferential treatment, tax and otherwise, was clearly on the minds of New York State leaders at a more enlightened point in our state’s history. Consider Article 3, Section 17 of the New York State Constitution, which prohibits "granting to any person, association, firm or corporation an exemption of real or personal property." It also forbids "granting any person, association or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise whatever." Then there is Article 16, Section 4 which states "there shall be no discrimination in the rates and method of taxation between such corporations and other corporations exercising substantially similar functions and engaged in substantially similar businesses within the state." But it doesn’t matter. Whenever the economy is good, more special tax deals are enacted as added revenues come in.  And whenever the economy is bad, rates are raised.  Sometimes they are rolled back, and sometimes not.

Economically efficient taxation includes a low tax rate spread over a wide tax base. In New York State, on the other hand, politically efficient taxation includes high tax rates spread over a tax base narrowed by exemptions, privileges, deductions, and tolerated tax evasion. Preferential treatment, tax and otherwise, was clearly on the minds of New York State leaders at a more enlightened point in our state’s history. Consider Article 3, Section 17 of the New York State Constitution, which prohibits "granting to any person, association, firm or corporation an exemption of real or personal property." It also forbids "granting any person, association or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise whatever." Then there is Article 16, Section 4 which states "there shall be no discrimination in the rates and method of taxation between such corporations and other corporations exercising substantially similar functions and engaged in substantially similar businesses within the state." But it doesn’t matter. Whenever the economy is good, more special tax deals are enacted as added revenues come in.  And whenever the economy is bad, rates are raised.  Sometimes they are rolled back, and sometimes not.

Economically efficient taxation includes a low tax rate spread over a wide tax base. In New York State, on the other hand, politically efficient taxation includes high tax rates spread over a tax base narrowed by exemptions, privileges, deductions, and tolerated tax evasion. Preferential treatment, tax and otherwise, was clearly on the minds of New York State leaders at a more enlightened point in our state’s history. Consider Article 3, Section 17 of the New York State Constitution, which prohibits "granting to any person, association, firm or corporation an exemption of real or personal property." It also forbids "granting any person, association or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise whatever." Then there is Article 16, Section 4 which states "there shall be no discrimination in the rates and method of taxation between such corporations and other corporations exercising substantially similar functions and engaged in substantially similar businesses within the state." But it doesn’t matter. Whenever the economy is good, more special tax deals are enacted as added revenues come in.  And whenever the economy is bad, rates are raised.  Sometimes they are rolled back, and sometimes not.

If you have been paying attention, you have read that I recommend changes to New York State’s Medicaid program to create incentives to reduce spending.  I propose similar changes in incentives to reduce spending in the state’s public schools outside New York City, partially balanced by increased spending in districts where spending is low, particularly New York City – but a smaller increase than proposed by the plaintiffs in the Campaign for Fiscal Equity case.   The tax surcharge-based disclosure of the cost of retiree health benefits, pensions, and debts I have suggested are intended to limit, in the long term, the hidden growth of employee compensation and the interest burden of excess debt.  One might conclude that my proposals would lead to lower taxes.  And in the long run, when state and local taxes are combined, that could be the case.  But not in the short run for state taxes alone.

If you have been paying attention, you have read that I recommend changes to New York State’s Medicaid program to create incentives to reduce spending.  I propose similar changes in incentives to reduce spending in the state’s public schools outside New York City, partially balanced by increased spending in districts where spending is low, particularly New York City – but a smaller increase than proposed by the plaintiffs in the Campaign for Fiscal Equity case.   The tax surcharge-based disclosure of the cost of retiree health benefits, pensions, and debts I have suggested are intended to limit, in the long term, the hidden growth of employee compensation and the interest burden of excess debt.  One might conclude that my proposals would lead to lower taxes.  And in the long run, when state and local taxes are combined, that could be the case.  But not in the short run for state taxes alone.

If you have been paying attention, you have read that I recommend changes to New York State’s Medicaid program to create incentives to reduce spending.  I propose similar changes in incentives to reduce spending in the state’s public schools outside New York City, partially balanced by increased spending in districts where spending is low, particularly New York City – but a smaller increase than proposed by the plaintiffs in the Campaign for Fiscal Equity case.   The tax surcharge-based disclosure of the cost of retiree health benefits, pensions, and debts I have suggested are intended to limit, in the long term, the hidden growth of employee compensation and the interest burden of excess debt.  One might conclude that my proposals would lead to lower taxes.  And in the long run, when state and local taxes are combined, that could be the case.  But not in the short run for state taxes alone.

New York State’s politicians have found a magic way to reward their supporters lavishly without everyone else noticing how much they are being hurt:  they borrow the money, and put off the cost to a future they don’t care about.  Every year the debt rises, and our future is diminished.  It may be that the state budget wouldn’t pass otherwise, because it is only by finding an unseen victim that everyone who matters can be more-or-less satisfied.  But New York’s debts have grown so large that at this point current New Yorkers aren’t much better off at the expense of the future, they are simply less worse off as a result of the past, as the result of borrowing more.  The bomb has been timed to go off during the next administration.