Among the Medicaid budget cuts Governor Spitzer has proposed, and the hospital and nursing home industries are gearing up to fight, is a rate freeze for 2007 in place of the automatic inflation adjustment these industries would otherwise be entitled to. In the past, whenever the state budget has been tight, these industries have received more money automatically, while other needs and concerns, whose increases (or even avoidance of decreases) must be approved each year, have been forced to fight over whatever money is left. Medicaid also has gotten the first bite of the apple at the local government level, as payments to the state are mandatory. By taking away the automatic increase, Governor Spitzer would not disadvantage hospitals and nursing homes in the future, when the state might be facing fiscal problems. He would merely put them in the same position that public schools, transportation, and other public services have always been in — with no guarantees, and thus forced to compete equally in surplus or shortage.
Tag: Albany
Inflation Adjustment and Political Power
|Among the Medicaid budget cuts Governor Spitzer has proposed, and the hospital and nursing home industries are gearing up to fight, is a rate freeze for 2007 in place of the automatic inflation adjustment these industries would otherwise be entitled to. In the past, whenever the state budget has been tight, these industries have received more money automatically, while other needs and concerns, whose increases (or even avoidance of decreases) must be approved each year, have been forced to fight over whatever money is left. Medicaid also has gotten the first bite of the apple at the local government level, as payments to the state are mandatory. By taking away the automatic increase, Governor Spitzer would not disadvantage hospitals and nursing homes in the future, when the state might be facing fiscal problems. He would merely put them in the same position that public schools, transportation, and other public services have always been in — with no guarantees, and thus forced to compete equally in surplus or shortage.
Taxes & Generational Equity: State and Local Taxes
|This post continues a discussion of how and why a hypothetical couple age 67 and earning $75,000 per year would pay little more than one-third the federal, state and local taxes as a young working couple with the exact same income. Even though, to the extent the two couple’s non-money situations differed, the senior citizens were better off. The scenarios are laid out, and a spreadsheet is attached, here. The topic of this post is New York’s state and local taxes. Based on some assumptions and the TurboTax program, my hypothetical older couple, the Senior Voters, would owe just $2,570, or 3.4% of their income, in New York State and New York City taxes. But my hypothetical young couple, Young and Younger Hopeful, would owe $7,962 in state and local taxes, or 10.6% of income. Adding a one-year-old “Baby Hopeful” would cut the state and local bill only slightly, to $7,857 or 10.5% of income. Eliminating Ms. Hopeful’s job and cutting the couple’s income to $50,000 per year would reduce the state and local tax burden to $5,346 (10.7% of that reduced income), still double what the Senior Voters pay at $75,000 in income. The rest of the post shows how this is so.
Taxes & Generational Equity: State and Local Taxes
|This post continues a discussion of how and why a hypothetical couple age 67 and earning $75,000 per year would pay little more than one-third the federal, state and local taxes as a young working couple with the exact same income. Even though, to the extent the two couple’s non-money situations differed, the senior citizens were better off. The scenarios are laid out, and a spreadsheet is attached, here. The topic of this post is New York’s state and local taxes. Based on some assumptions and the TurboTax program, my hypothetical older couple, the Senior Voters, would owe just $2,570, or 3.4% of their income, in New York State and New York City taxes. But my hypothetical young couple, Young and Younger Hopeful, would owe $7,962 in state and local taxes, or 10.6% of income. Adding a one-year-old “Baby Hopeful” would cut the state and local bill only slightly, to $7,857 or 10.5% of income. Eliminating Ms. Hopeful’s job and cutting the couple’s income to $50,000 per year would reduce the state and local tax burden to $5,346 (10.7% of that reduced income), still double what the Senior Voters pay at $75,000 in income. The rest of the post shows how this is so.
Taxes & Generational Equity: State and Local Taxes
|This post continues a discussion of how and why a hypothetical couple age 67 and earning $75,000 per year would pay little more than one-third the federal, state and local taxes as a young working couple with the exact same income. Even though, to the extent the two couple’s non-money situations differed, the senior citizens were better off. The scenarios are laid out, and a spreadsheet is attached, here. The topic of this post is New York’s state and local taxes. Based on some assumptions and the TurboTax program, my hypothetical older couple, the Senior Voters, would owe just $2,570, or 3.4% of their income, in New York State and New York City taxes. But my hypothetical young couple, Young and Younger Hopeful, would owe $7,962 in state and local taxes, or 10.6% of income. Adding a one-year-old “Baby Hopeful” would cut the state and local bill only slightly, to $7,857 or 10.5% of income. Eliminating Ms. Hopeful’s job and cutting the couple’s income to $50,000 per year would reduce the state and local tax burden to $5,346 (10.7% of that reduced income), still double what the Senior Voters pay at $75,000 in income. The rest of the post shows how this is so.
Taxes & Generational Equity: State and Local Taxes
|This post continues a discussion of how and why a hypothetical couple age 67 and earning $75,000 per year would pay little more than one-third the federal, state and local taxes as a young working couple with the exact same income. Even though, to the extent the two couple’s non-money situations differed, the senior citizens were better off. The scenarios are laid out, and a spreadsheet is attached, here. The topic of this post is New York’s state and local taxes. Based on some assumptions and the TurboTax program, my hypothetical older couple, the Senior Voters, would owe just $2,570, or 3.4% of their income, in New York State and New York City taxes. But my hypothetical young couple, Young and Younger Hopeful, would owe $7,962 in state and local taxes, or 10.6% of income. Adding a one-year-old “Baby Hopeful” would cut the state and local bill only slightly, to $7,857 or 10.5% of income. Eliminating Ms. Hopeful’s job and cutting the couple’s income to $50,000 per year would reduce the state and local tax burden to $5,346 (10.7% of that reduced income), still double what the Senior Voters pay at $75,000 in income. The rest of the post shows how this is so.
Taxes & Generational Equity: State and Local Taxes
|This post continues a discussion of how and why a hypothetical couple age 67 and earning $75,000 per year would pay little more than one-third the federal, state and local taxes as a young working couple with the exact same income. Even though, to the extent the two couple’s non-money situations differed, the senior citizens were better off. The scenarios are laid out, and a spreadsheet is attached, here. The topic of this post is New York’s state and local taxes. Based on some assumptions and the TurboTax program, my hypothetical older couple, the Senior Voters, would owe just $2,570, or 3.4% of their income, in New York State and New York City taxes. But my hypothetical young couple, Young and Younger Hopeful, would owe $7,962 in state and local taxes, or 10.6% of income. Adding a one-year-old “Baby Hopeful” would cut the state and local bill only slightly, to $7,857 or 10.5% of income. Eliminating Ms. Hopeful’s job and cutting the couple’s income to $50,000 per year would reduce the state and local tax burden to $5,346 (10.7% of that reduced income), still double what the Senior Voters pay at $75,000 in income. The rest of the post shows how this is so.
Taxes & Generational Equity: State and Local Taxes
|This post continues a discussion of how and why a hypothetical couple age 67 and earning $75,000 per year would pay little more than one-third the federal, state and local taxes as a young working couple with the exact same income. Even though, to the extent the two couple’s non-money situations differed, the senior citizens were better off. The scenarios are laid out, and a spreadsheet is attached, here. The topic of this post is New York’s state and local taxes. Based on some assumptions and the TurboTax program, my hypothetical older couple, the Senior Voters, would owe just $2,570, or 3.4% of their income, in New York State and New York City taxes. But my hypothetical young couple, Young and Younger Hopeful, would owe $7,962 in state and local taxes, or 10.6% of income. Adding a one-year-old “Baby Hopeful” would cut the state and local bill only slightly, to $7,857 or 10.5% of income. Eliminating Ms. Hopeful’s job and cutting the couple’s income to $50,000 per year would reduce the state and local tax burden to $5,346 (10.7% of that reduced income), still double what the Senior Voters pay at $75,000 in income. The rest of the post shows how this is so.
Tom DiNapoli’s Burden
|Mr. DiNapoli is the Comptroller, despite being having been called “unqualified,” and it is now his burden to prove the critics wrong. Unlike the Governor or the media it is not his technical qualifications that trouble me. Experts can be hired to provide information and advice, although the person doing the hiring must have enough knowledge to evaluate that advice, which often conflicts. My concern with a former member of the Assembly serving as Comptroller is different — conflict of interest. Our incumbent elected officials, those who work for them, and the small number groups that support them, have become an insular tribe with overlapping interests that conflict with, and have been given priority over, those of most current and all future New Yorkers. As Comptroller, Mr. DiNapoli will oversee three functions — financial reporting, auditing of state agencies and local governments, and pension administration. In each of those functions, doing an honest job would require him to show, for all to see, who the winners are, and who the losers are.
Tom DiNapoli’s Burden
|Mr. DiNapoli is the Comptroller, despite being having been called “unqualified,” and it is now his burden to prove the critics wrong. Unlike the Governor or the media it is not his technical qualifications that trouble me. Experts can be hired to provide information and advice, although the person doing the hiring must have enough knowledge to evaluate that advice, which often conflicts. My concern with a former member of the Assembly serving as Comptroller is different — conflict of interest. Our incumbent elected officials, those who work for them, and the small number groups that support them, have become an insular tribe with overlapping interests that conflict with, and have been given priority over, those of most current and all future New Yorkers. As Comptroller, Mr. DiNapoli will oversee three functions — financial reporting, auditing of state agencies and local governments, and pension administration. In each of those functions, doing an honest job would require him to show, for all to see, who the winners are, and who the losers are.
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