Survivorship Bias

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia:  a statistical artifact…where studies on the remaining population are fallaciously compared with the historic average despite the survivors having unusual properties.  Mostly, the unusual property in question is a track record of success.

It is a mantra among conservative commentators, when pushing privatization and other business provision of public services, that private businesses are more efficient than government agencies.  Let’s leave aside the fact that, based on my experience with the matter, one of the things private businesses do efficiently is rip off the taxpayer.  The presumption of private sector superiority is based on survivorship bias.  Certainly Enron, and the hundreds of thousands of other private companies that go out of business each year, are not more efficient and competent than the typical public agency.  While some such companies can do a lot of damage prior to bankruptcy, however, eventually that damage ends, leaving more efficient and competent businesses as the predominant type operating at any one time.  Private sector efficiency, therefore, is not a result of inherent competence, but of trial and error.  In the public sector, and in certain private industries that rely on public funds, on the other hand, organizations and their employees are presumed to have a right to their current situation, regardless of the value they produce for others.  Since most of the services and benefits produced by the public sector are necessities, rather than mere wants, the least competent and efficient organizations grow, using more resources over time, in an attempt to get the necessary work done.

Survivorship Bias

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia:  a statistical artifact…where studies on the remaining population are fallaciously compared with the historic average despite the survivors having unusual properties.  Mostly, the unusual property in question is a track record of success.

It is a mantra among conservative commentators, when pushing privatization and other business provision of public services, that private businesses are more efficient than government agencies.  Let’s leave aside the fact that, based on my experience with the matter, one of the things private businesses do efficiently is rip off the taxpayer.  The presumption of private sector superiority is based on survivorship bias.  Certainly Enron, and the hundreds of thousands of other private companies that go out of business each year, are not more efficient and competent than the typical public agency.  While some such companies can do a lot of damage prior to bankruptcy, however, eventually that damage ends, leaving more efficient and competent businesses as the predominant type operating at any one time.  Private sector efficiency, therefore, is not a result of inherent competence, but of trial and error.  In the public sector, and in certain private industries that rely on public funds, on the other hand, organizations and their employees are presumed to have a right to their current situation, regardless of the value they produce for others.  Since most of the services and benefits produced by the public sector are necessities, rather than mere wants, the least competent and efficient organizations grow, using more resources over time, in an attempt to get the necessary work done.

Survivorship Bias

|

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia:  a statistical artifact…where studies on the remaining population are fallaciously compared with the historic average despite the survivors having unusual properties.  Mostly, the unusual property in question is a track record of success.

It is a mantra among conservative commentators, when pushing privatization and other business provision of public services, that private businesses are more efficient than government agencies.  Let’s leave aside the fact that, based on my experience with the matter, one of the things private businesses do efficiently is rip off the taxpayer.  The presumption of private sector superiority is based on survivorship bias.  Certainly Enron, and the hundreds of thousands of other private companies that go out of business each year, are not more efficient and competent than the typical public agency.  While some such companies can do a lot of damage prior to bankruptcy, however, eventually that damage ends, leaving more efficient and competent businesses as the predominant type operating at any one time.  Private sector efficiency, therefore, is not a result of inherent competence, but of trial and error.  In the public sector, and in certain private industries that rely on public funds, on the other hand, organizations and their employees are presumed to have a right to their current situation, regardless of the value they produce for others.  Since most of the services and benefits produced by the public sector are necessities, rather than mere wants, the least competent and efficient organizations grow, using more resources over time, in an attempt to get the necessary work done.

Survivorship Bias

|

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia:  a statistical artifact…where studies on the remaining population are fallaciously compared with the historic average despite the survivors having unusual properties.  Mostly, the unusual property in question is a track record of success.

It is a mantra among conservative commentators, when pushing privatization and other business provision of public services, that private businesses are more efficient than government agencies.  Let’s leave aside the fact that, based on my experience with the matter, one of the things private businesses do efficiently is rip off the taxpayer.  The presumption of private sector superiority is based on survivorship bias.  Certainly Enron, and the hundreds of thousands of other private companies that go out of business each year, are not more efficient and competent than the typical public agency.  While some such companies can do a lot of damage prior to bankruptcy, however, eventually that damage ends, leaving more efficient and competent businesses as the predominant type operating at any one time.  Private sector efficiency, therefore, is not a result of inherent competence, but of trial and error.  In the public sector, and in certain private industries that rely on public funds, on the other hand, organizations and their employees are presumed to have a right to their current situation, regardless of the value they produce for others.  Since most of the services and benefits produced by the public sector are necessities, rather than mere wants, the least competent and efficient organizations grow, using more resources over time, in an attempt to get the necessary work done.

What I Would Do About the Dilemma of Discretion

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As I wrote here whether the government is hiring public employees or companies, it faces what I call the “dilemma of discretion.” Allow public sector managers to hire and fire whoever they please, and the government runs the risk of having their brother-in-law – or the brother-in-law of a politico who is in a position to threaten them – hired, and good employees fired.  But bind those managers with all kinds of rules, to hire those who score highest on a civil service test and only fire an employee after a complicated series of steps, and you create a legalistic playground for those who seek to get paid to do a job without actually doing it.   The civil service system and bidding rules, by making personnel and contractor arrangements non-voluntary, eliminate reciprocity in the employment and contracting relationship. Once a test is passed or a contract is won, the employee or contractor owes as little as he can get away with. Management often seeks to do as little as possible for the employees in turn. The result is ongoing, petty conflict over rules, a poisonous work atmosphere, and low productivity and quality – the government is a lousy place to work, and many firms refuse to do business with it.

What I Would Do About the Dilemma of Discretion

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As I wrote here whether the government is hiring public employees or companies, it faces what I call the “dilemma of discretion.” Allow public sector managers to hire and fire whoever they please, and the government runs the risk of having their brother-in-law – or the brother-in-law of a politico who is in a position to threaten them – hired, and good employees fired.  But bind those managers with all kinds of rules, to hire those who score highest on a civil service test and only fire an employee after a complicated series of steps, and you create a legalistic playground for those who seek to get paid to do a job without actually doing it.   The civil service system and bidding rules, by making personnel and contractor arrangements non-voluntary, eliminate reciprocity in the employment and contracting relationship. Once a test is passed or a contract is won, the employee or contractor owes as little as he can get away with. Management often seeks to do as little as possible for the employees in turn. The result is ongoing, petty conflict over rules, a poisonous work atmosphere, and low productivity and quality – the government is a lousy place to work, and many firms refuse to do business with it.

What I Would Do About the Dilemma of Discretion

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As I wrote here whether the government is hiring public employees or companies, it faces what I call the “dilemma of discretion.” Allow public sector managers to hire and fire whoever they please, and the government runs the risk of having their brother-in-law – or the brother-in-law of a politico who is in a position to threaten them – hired, and good employees fired.  But bind those managers with all kinds of rules, to hire those who score highest on a civil service test and only fire an employee after a complicated series of steps, and you create a legalistic playground for those who seek to get paid to do a job without actually doing it.   The civil service system and bidding rules, by making personnel and contractor arrangements non-voluntary, eliminate reciprocity in the employment and contracting relationship. Once a test is passed or a contract is won, the employee or contractor owes as little as he can get away with. Management often seeks to do as little as possible for the employees in turn. The result is ongoing, petty conflict over rules, a poisonous work atmosphere, and low productivity and quality – the government is a lousy place to work, and many firms refuse to do business with it.

What I Would Do About the Dilemma of Discretion

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As I wrote here whether the government is hiring public employees or companies, it faces what I call the “dilemma of discretion.” Allow public sector managers to hire and fire whoever they please, and the government runs the risk of having their brother-in-law – or the brother-in-law of a politico who is in a position to threaten them – hired, and good employees fired.  But bind those managers with all kinds of rules, to hire those who score highest on a civil service test and only fire an employee after a complicated series of steps, and you create a legalistic playground for those who seek to get paid to do a job without actually doing it.   The civil service system and bidding rules, by making personnel and contractor arrangements non-voluntary, eliminate reciprocity in the employment and contracting relationship. Once a test is passed or a contract is won, the employee or contractor owes as little as he can get away with. Management often seeks to do as little as possible for the employees in turn. The result is ongoing, petty conflict over rules, a poisonous work atmosphere, and low productivity and quality – the government is a lousy place to work, and many firms refuse to do business with it.

What I Would Do About the Dilemma of Discretion

|

As I wrote here whether the government is hiring public employees or companies, it faces what I call the “dilemma of discretion.” Allow public sector managers to hire and fire whoever they please, and the government runs the risk of having their brother-in-law – or the brother-in-law of a politico who is in a position to threaten them – hired, and good employees fired.  But bind those managers with all kinds of rules, to hire those who score highest on a civil service test and only fire an employee after a complicated series of steps, and you create a legalistic playground for those who seek to get paid to do a job without actually doing it.   The civil service system and bidding rules, by making personnel and contractor arrangements non-voluntary, eliminate reciprocity in the employment and contracting relationship. Once a test is passed or a contract is won, the employee or contractor owes as little as he can get away with. Management often seeks to do as little as possible for the employees in turn. The result is ongoing, petty conflict over rules, a poisonous work atmosphere, and low productivity and quality – the government is a lousy place to work, and many firms refuse to do business with it.

What I Would Do About the Dilemma of Discretion

|

As I wrote here whether the government is hiring public employees or companies, it faces what I call the “dilemma of discretion.” Allow public sector managers to hire and fire whoever they please, and the government runs the risk of having their brother-in-law – or the brother-in-law of a politico who is in a position to threaten them – hired, and good employees fired.  But bind those managers with all kinds of rules, to hire those who score highest on a civil service test and only fire an employee after a complicated series of steps, and you create a legalistic playground for those who seek to get paid to do a job without actually doing it.   The civil service system and bidding rules, by making personnel and contractor arrangements non-voluntary, eliminate reciprocity in the employment and contracting relationship. Once a test is passed or a contract is won, the employee or contractor owes as little as he can get away with. Management often seeks to do as little as possible for the employees in turn. The result is ongoing, petty conflict over rules, a poisonous work atmosphere, and low productivity and quality – the government is a lousy place to work, and many firms refuse to do business with it.