This article wraps up my journey through this year’s NYC primary results (see also here, here, and here ), which were recently posted on the Board Elections’ website. There will be a summary of my the post-primary observations not made in previous articles, as well as some other things I’ve gleaned from other info recently posted by the Board. (I’ll admit this series would probably have been far more extensive if John Mollenkopf’s maps of the 11th CD race hadn’t convinced me of the futility of trying to give informed analysis with limited resources). But first:
The Latest
What I Would Do About the Dilemma of Discretion
|As I wrote here whether the government is hiring public employees or companies, it faces what I call the “dilemma of discretion.” Allow public sector managers to hire and fire whoever they please, and the government runs the risk of having their brother-in-law – or the brother-in-law of a politico who is in a position to threaten them – hired, and good employees fired. But bind those managers with all kinds of rules, to hire those who score highest on a civil service test and only fire an employee after a complicated series of steps, and you create a legalistic playground for those who seek to get paid to do a job without actually doing it. The civil service system and bidding rules, by making personnel and contractor arrangements non-voluntary, eliminate reciprocity in the employment and contracting relationship. Once a test is passed or a contract is won, the employee or contractor owes as little as he can get away with. Management often seeks to do as little as possible for the employees in turn. The result is ongoing, petty conflict over rules, a poisonous work atmosphere, and low productivity and quality – the government is a lousy place to work, and many firms refuse to do business with it.
What I Would Do About the Dilemma of Discretion
|As I wrote here whether the government is hiring public employees or companies, it faces what I call the “dilemma of discretion.” Allow public sector managers to hire and fire whoever they please, and the government runs the risk of having their brother-in-law – or the brother-in-law of a politico who is in a position to threaten them – hired, and good employees fired. But bind those managers with all kinds of rules, to hire those who score highest on a civil service test and only fire an employee after a complicated series of steps, and you create a legalistic playground for those who seek to get paid to do a job without actually doing it. The civil service system and bidding rules, by making personnel and contractor arrangements non-voluntary, eliminate reciprocity in the employment and contracting relationship. Once a test is passed or a contract is won, the employee or contractor owes as little as he can get away with. Management often seeks to do as little as possible for the employees in turn. The result is ongoing, petty conflict over rules, a poisonous work atmosphere, and low productivity and quality – the government is a lousy place to work, and many firms refuse to do business with it.
What I Would Do About the Dilemma of Discretion
|As I wrote here whether the government is hiring public employees or companies, it faces what I call the “dilemma of discretion.” Allow public sector managers to hire and fire whoever they please, and the government runs the risk of having their brother-in-law – or the brother-in-law of a politico who is in a position to threaten them – hired, and good employees fired. But bind those managers with all kinds of rules, to hire those who score highest on a civil service test and only fire an employee after a complicated series of steps, and you create a legalistic playground for those who seek to get paid to do a job without actually doing it. The civil service system and bidding rules, by making personnel and contractor arrangements non-voluntary, eliminate reciprocity in the employment and contracting relationship. Once a test is passed or a contract is won, the employee or contractor owes as little as he can get away with. Management often seeks to do as little as possible for the employees in turn. The result is ongoing, petty conflict over rules, a poisonous work atmosphere, and low productivity and quality – the government is a lousy place to work, and many firms refuse to do business with it.
Did Charles Barron Win the Black Vote (Who Can Tell?)?: Another Statistical Exercise
|This is the third part of my trawl through the Primary results just posted on the NYC Board of Elections website. I finished this piece before I learned of John Mollenkopf’s more detailed Election District by Election District (ED) analysis of some of the same races, which puts mine to shame. However, I think the points I raise are still worthy of discussion, so I’m posting this rather than trashing it.
The object of this series is to examine shibboleths concerning the results which have arisen since the September 12th primary. For example, it has been reported, in the Brooklyn Paper, and in several blogs, that in the 25th Senate District challenger Ken Diamondstone beat incumbent Martin Connor in the district’s Brooklyn portion, and, in fact it’s been reported that Diamondstone has publicly taunted Connor over this (I’m sure Connor’s crying all the way to Albany). It’s a great story. But it’s not true. In actuality, Connor carried Brooklyn 3864 to 3,806, with two write-in votes going to Tracy Boyland.
What I Would Do About Public Employee Pensions
|The public employee retirement system contains a slew of inequities that benefit the politically powerful – public employees with seniority – at the expense of everyone else, including more recently hired public employees, and the future. These inequities and negative future consequences grow year-by-year, contract-by-contract, one act of the state legislature after another.
Public employees aren’t grateful for their rich pensions, if their unions are to be believed. Instead they resent the modest pay that often comes with a public sector career, sometimes using it as a rationalization for modest performance. And low pay and limited respect, combined with rich pensions, affects the type of worker the government can attract. Along with increasingly cynical and disappointed idealists that signed on out some idea of “public service,” public agencies tend to attract only those who, from their first day of work, look forward to not working.
What I Would Do About Public Employee Pensions
|The public employee retirement system contains a slew of inequities that benefit the politically powerful – public employees with seniority – at the expense of everyone else, including more recently hired public employees, and the future. These inequities and negative future consequences grow year-by-year, contract-by-contract, one act of the state legislature after another.
Public employees aren’t grateful for their rich pensions, if their unions are to be believed. Instead they resent the modest pay that often comes with a public sector career, sometimes using it as a rationalization for modest performance. And low pay and limited respect, combined with rich pensions, affects the type of worker the government can attract. Along with increasingly cynical and disappointed idealists that signed on out some idea of “public service,” public agencies tend to attract only those who, from their first day of work, look forward to not working.
What I Would Do About Public Employee Pensions
|The public employee retirement system contains a slew of inequities that benefit the politically powerful – public employees with seniority – at the expense of everyone else, including more recently hired public employees, and the future. These inequities and negative future consequences grow year-by-year, contract-by-contract, one act of the state legislature after another.
Public employees aren’t grateful for their rich pensions, if their unions are to be believed. Instead they resent the modest pay that often comes with a public sector career, sometimes using it as a rationalization for modest performance. And low pay and limited respect, combined with rich pensions, affects the type of worker the government can attract. Along with increasingly cynical and disappointed idealists that signed on out some idea of “public service,” public agencies tend to attract only those who, from their first day of work, look forward to not working.
Dog Bites Man: Post Columnist Distorts Truth
|“Jersey’s Lesson for GOP
By Arnold Ahlert
New York Post, October 9, 2006
On September 30, 2002, Democratic Sen. Robert Torricelli, mired in an ethic scandal, retired – and was replaced on the New Jersey ballot by former Senator Frank Lautenberg.
On October 2, the State’s Supreme Court decided that Lautenberg could be added to the ballot 34 days before the election – violating a state election law requiring a 51 day limit.
On September 29, 2006, Republican Mark Foley, mired in an ethics scandal, retired and was not replaced on the Florida ballot by the actual candidate Joe Negron – because it violated Florida election laws.
Did Owens Cost Yassky the Election? (Maybe); Did Yassky Cost Owens the Election? (Probably Not): A Statistical Exercise
|“What ifs” always raise unpleasant issues; after all, as the French say, “if bubbe had cojones she’d be zayde”, and if the Democrats had cojones they’d be in the White House and we’d be in Darfur instead of Iraq (but Michael Moore would still be complaining).
In the aftermath of this year’s congressional primaries, many “what ifs” have been raised about the race in the 11th District; both supporters of runner-up David Yassky (ruefully, and under their breathe, or after a few beers) and also-ran Chris Owens (by the candidate himself, in his concession speech) have claimed, contrary to the initial conventional wisdom that the presence in the race of additional black candidates helped Yassky, that Owens cost Yassky the primary.