PLANYC 2030: RATIONING SCARCITY

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Let’s say we have a public benefit, service, facility or square footage of space that theoretically belongs equally to everyone, cannot be increased at a reasonable cost, and for which the demand far exceeds the supply. How do you decide who gets it? Do you have everyone grab what they can as fast as they can, hoarding and wasting, while those with greater needs are left out in the cold — and disaster is risked if the public benefit, service, facility or space is overwhelmed? Do you use a political process where insiders with power get permits that are then passed on to other insiders, while everyone else, rich and poor, is left to do without? Or should those who have use of the scarce resource have to pay, with the funds used to compensate those who do without it, so that demand equals the supply? New York City has, in fact, has a scarcity of traffic capacity in the Manhattan CBD — and many other areas — on weekdays, and a shortage of electrical generating capacity at peak times on hot days. Today it uses a combination of a grab by those who feel entitled or are willing to sit in traffic (by driving over free bridges or cranking the air conditioning during power shortages) and political power (on-street parking permits) to decide who gets to drive to Manhattan and use electricity on 90 degree afternoons. PLANYC2030 has a different suggestion, and I agree with it.

PLANYC 2030: RATIONING SCARCITY

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Let’s say we have a public benefit, service, facility or square footage of space that theoretically belongs equally to everyone, cannot be increased at a reasonable cost, and for which the demand far exceeds the supply. How do you decide who gets it? Do you have everyone grab what they can as fast as they can, hoarding and wasting, while those with greater needs are left out in the cold — and disaster is risked if the public benefit, service, facility or space is overwhelmed? Do you use a political process where insiders with power get permits that are then passed on to other insiders, while everyone else, rich and poor, is left to do without? Or should those who have use of the scarce resource have to pay, with the funds used to compensate those who do without it, so that demand equals the supply? New York City has, in fact, has a scarcity of traffic capacity in the Manhattan CBD — and many other areas — on weekdays, and a shortage of electrical generating capacity at peak times on hot days. Today it uses a combination of a grab by those who feel entitled or are willing to sit in traffic (by driving over free bridges or cranking the air conditioning during power shortages) and political power (on-street parking permits) to decide who gets to drive to Manhattan and use electricity on 90 degree afternoons. PLANYC2030 has a different suggestion, and I agree with it.

PLANYC 2030: RATIONING SCARCITY

|

Let’s say we have a public benefit, service, facility or square footage of space that theoretically belongs equally to everyone, cannot be increased at a reasonable cost, and for which the demand far exceeds the supply. How do you decide who gets it? Do you have everyone grab what they can as fast as they can, hoarding and wasting, while those with greater needs are left out in the cold — and disaster is risked if the public benefit, service, facility or space is overwhelmed? Do you use a political process where insiders with power get permits that are then passed on to other insiders, while everyone else, rich and poor, is left to do without? Or should those who have use of the scarce resource have to pay, with the funds used to compensate those who do without it, so that demand equals the supply? New York City has, in fact, has a scarcity of traffic capacity in the Manhattan CBD — and many other areas — on weekdays, and a shortage of electrical generating capacity at peak times on hot days. Today it uses a combination of a grab by those who feel entitled or are willing to sit in traffic (by driving over free bridges or cranking the air conditioning during power shortages) and political power (on-street parking permits) to decide who gets to drive to Manhattan and use electricity on 90 degree afternoons. PLANYC2030 has a different suggestion, and I agree with it.

The Principal’s Contract: Better Than the Last One

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The contract just reached between the city and the principal’s union contains some new ideas that are relatively fair to the rest of us. First, it includes higher pay for those with tougher jobs — running failing schools. Second, it ends the guarantee of an assistant principal job for assistant principals in schools that are closed down due to failure. Such
employees, if no other principal wanted to take them on, would be given the option of a buyout or teaching half a day. It also added merit pay, something I am less keen on given my lack of confidence in the ability of public sector managers to fairly identify merit, although the success of an entire school may be easier to judge than that of an individual employee. These, however, are half-measures, adopted after years of standoff with the City using the minimal leverage it has — deferring a contract and allowing wages to lag behind inflation, falling in real dollars. It was a limited gain from a very protracted fight.

The Principal’s Contract: Better Than the Last One

|

The contract just reached between the city and the principal’s union contains some new ideas that are relatively fair to the rest of us. First, it includes higher pay for those with tougher jobs — running failing schools. Second, it ends the guarantee of an assistant principal job for assistant principals in schools that are closed down due to failure. Such
employees, if no other principal wanted to take them on, would be given the option of a buyout or teaching half a day. It also added merit pay, something I am less keen on given my lack of confidence in the ability of public sector managers to fairly identify merit, although the success of an entire school may be easier to judge than that of an individual employee. These, however, are half-measures, adopted after years of standoff with the City using the minimal leverage it has — deferring a contract and allowing wages to lag behind inflation, falling in real dollars. It was a limited gain from a very protracted fight.

The Principal’s Contract: Better Than the Last One

|

The contract just reached between the city and the principal’s union contains some new ideas that are relatively fair to the rest of us. First, it includes higher pay for those with tougher jobs — running failing schools. Second, it ends the guarantee of an assistant principal job for assistant principals in schools that are closed down due to failure. Such
employees, if no other principal wanted to take them on, would be given the option of a buyout or teaching half a day. It also added merit pay, something I am less keen on given my lack of confidence in the ability of public sector managers to fairly identify merit, although the success of an entire school may be easier to judge than that of an individual employee. These, however, are half-measures, adopted after years of standoff with the City using the minimal leverage it has — deferring a contract and allowing wages to lag behind inflation, falling in real dollars. It was a limited gain from a very protracted fight.

The Principal’s Contract: Better Than the Last One

|

The contract just reached between the city and the principal’s union contains some new ideas that are relatively fair to the rest of us. First, it includes higher pay for those with tougher jobs — running failing schools. Second, it ends the guarantee of an assistant principal job for assistant principals in schools that are closed down due to failure. Such
employees, if no other principal wanted to take them on, would be given the option of a buyout or teaching half a day. It also added merit pay, something I am less keen on given my lack of confidence in the ability of public sector managers to fairly identify merit, although the success of an entire school may be easier to judge than that of an individual employee. These, however, are half-measures, adopted after years of standoff with the City using the minimal leverage it has — deferring a contract and allowing wages to lag behind inflation, falling in real dollars. It was a limited gain from a very protracted fight.

The Principal’s Contract: Better Than the Last One

|

The contract just reached between the city and the principal’s union contains some new ideas that are relatively fair to the rest of us. First, it includes higher pay for those with tougher jobs — running failing schools. Second, it ends the guarantee of an assistant principal job for assistant principals in schools that are closed down due to failure. Such
employees, if no other principal wanted to take them on, would be given the option of a buyout or teaching half a day. It also added merit pay, something I am less keen on given my lack of confidence in the ability of public sector managers to fairly identify merit, although the success of an entire school may be easier to judge than that of an individual employee. These, however, are half-measures, adopted after years of standoff with the City using the minimal leverage it has — deferring a contract and allowing wages to lag behind inflation, falling in real dollars. It was a limited gain from a very protracted fight.

The Principal’s Contract: Better Than the Last One

|

The contract just reached between the city and the principal’s union contains some new ideas that are relatively fair to the rest of us. First, it includes higher pay for those with tougher jobs — running failing schools. Second, it ends the guarantee of an assistant principal job for assistant principals in schools that are closed down due to failure. Such
employees, if no other principal wanted to take them on, would be given the option of a buyout or teaching half a day. It also added merit pay, something I am less keen on given my lack of confidence in the ability of public sector managers to fairly identify merit, although the success of an entire school may be easier to judge than that of an individual employee. These, however, are half-measures, adopted after years of standoff with the City using the minimal leverage it has — deferring a contract and allowing wages to lag behind inflation, falling in real dollars. It was a limited gain from a very protracted fight.

Three That Should Be the Same

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Based on what I read in the newspaper, I'll give credit to the Freelancers Union and Councilmember David Yassky for sticking up for one of New York's losers: self-employed freelancers and owners of their own small businesses. Many of the former are employees in all but name, but designated independent contractors so their employers do not have to pay social security and unemployment taxes, and can provide tax-free health insurance to the higher ups and those with seniority but not to new hires. Most of the victims of this shift in practice are the young, yet another two-tier contract with a worse-off following generation. And the City of New York adds injury to injury by taxing the income of freelancers twice, once through the local income tax and once through the unincorporated business tax.